begin with an overview of these developments in order to provide the context for the discussion.
However, the focus of this paper is on the recent developments as regards domestic violence within the context of the Council of Europe. In research carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, it was found that just over one in five women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence from a current or former partner.
2 Although this research was carried out only in the 28 states which make up the 
Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue
Although domestic violence constitutes a clear violation of a number of well-established human rights, it was not until relatively recently that this issue was recognised as falling within the ambit of international human rights law. The UN Convention on the 2 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 'Violence against women: an EU-wide survey ', (2014 
The Facts of Rumor v Italy
In Rumor, the applicant's then partner (referred to in the European Court's judgment as The applicant claimed that following the violence inflicted upon her by J.C.N., she lived in a state of constant fear. She had undergone psychological support therapy, as had her son, who had witnessed the violence. The applicant argued that there had been a violation of her right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European Convention, and also a breach of the Article 14 prohibition of discrimination when taken in conjunction with Article 3. She argued that the Italian authorities had failed to protect and support her following the violence which she had suffered. The applicant claimed that these omissions together with the inadequacy of the Italian legislative framework in combating domestic violence proved that she had been discriminated against on the ground of gender. The applicant stated that she had not been informed when J.C.N. had been granted house arrest, and that she had only become aware of this when she had received a telephone call from J.C.N. himself. In addition, at the beginning of J.C.N.'s detention, she had received several letters from him which she viewed as being of a threatening nature. The applicant was of the opinion that J.C.N.
continued to pose a threat both to her life and to the lives of her children. In addition,
she argued that the proximity to her home of the facility hosting J.C.N. had contributed to her fear of a re-occurrence of the violence. She also alleged that she had been contacted by a worker at the facility for the purposes of setting up a telephone conversation between J.C.N. and their son in August 2010. As any form of contact between J.C.N. and the children had been prohibited, the applicant viewed this incident as casting doubt on the appropriateness of the facility. She maintained that she was in a position of vulnerability, and that the state authorities had failed to assist her, as they had omitted to put in place sufficient measures to protect her from further violence at the hands of J.C.N.
Application of Article 3
In examining the merits of the case under Article 3, the European Court stated it considered the applicant to be a 'vulnerable individual', due to the physical injuries which she had suffered as a result of being attacked by her partner, and to her fear of further violence. 15 The Court held that the violence and the ensuing psychological consequences were sufficiently serious to constitute ill-treatment within the meaning of In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court stated that the Italian police, prosecutors and courts had not remained passive, as J.C.N. had been arrested and charged with attempted murder, kidnapping, aggravated violence and threatening behaviour. He had been convicted and ultimately sentenced to detention for three years and four months. The Court noted that having J.C.N. living at a distance of only 15 kilometres from her home had 'a negative impact' on the applicant. 18 However, the Court was of the view that prior to the application for house arrest having been granted, the post-sentencing judge seemed to have carefully assessed the suitability of the facility.
As regards the applicant's assertion that she had not been kept informed regarding the criminal proceedings against J.C.N., the Little information on this facility is given in the judgment, however it is stated that J.C.N.
was permitted to work outside the reception centre, and also that after he completed his sentence he chose to continue residing at the centre. It seems unlikely therefore that detention at the centre constituted a very punitive measure. In addition, the fact that this facility was situated only 15 kilometres from the applicant's home is troubling, particularly as J.C.N. had been granted permission to work outside the facility. This is especially problematic given that the applicant had not been informed by the authorities that J.C.N. had been granted house arrest, and she had only become aware of this fact refuse permission for the transfer to a facility situated within such close proximity to the victim's home in the first place.
The Court's Use of Article 14 in Domestic Violence Cases
In Rumor, the Court stated that in the light of its finding that there had been no violation of occasions, and the European Court observed that the authorities had been well aware of this. A.M. was allowed to live in the applicant's house for more than a year. Three protection orders were made by the domestic courts, however these orders were not enforced. Police officers and a social worker visited the applicant's house and talked with her and A.M., however the latter refused to leave the house or to sign a document stating that he had been warned not to commit acts of violence against the applicant.
Despite the existence of several domestic legal provisions which would have allowed the authorities to initiate criminal proceedings against A.M. and to subject him to a psychiatric examination with a view to deciding on the need to order compulsory psychiatric treatment, it nevertheless took the authorities almost a year to adopt such a course of action. The European Court found that there had been a violation of Article 3.
The Court then proceeded to state that 'the authorities' actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with violence against the applicant, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards her as a being of sufficient severity to merit such an investigation. The Court was of the view that this underlined 'the failure to realise, or to explain to the law-enforcement authorities, the specific nature of domestic violence, which does not always result in physical injury.'
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In addition, the authorities took a considerable length of time to consider the first applicant's request for a protection order, and then failed to send the order for enforcement. Thereafter, the police failed to take resolute action to remove the abuser from the common residence, and the domestic court then suspended enforcement of the order. Ultimately the first applicant was forced to leave her home and move into refuge accommodation. The European Court stated that,
The authorities' passivity in the present case is also apparent from their failure to consider protective measures before a formal application to that end was made, or to initiate a criminal investigation against M.M. before an official complaint about that was made…Considering the particular vulnerability of victims of domestic violence, who often fail to report incidents, it was for the authorities to verify whether the situation warranted a more robust reaction of the State and to at least inform the first applicant of the existing protective measures.
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The Court is to be commended for its recognition of the fact that domestic violence is a crime which victims are often too frightened or too ashamed to report, and that domestic violence may therefore require a somewhat different response from state authorities than that which is required as regards other forms of violence. Indeed this recognition, together with the Court's previous comment that the nature of domestic violence is such that it does not always result in physical injury, seems to indicate that the Court was attempting to engage with a 'gender-sensitive interpretation and application of (the The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately …Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence.
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It was emphasised, that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or on behalf of Governments …Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.
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The view of domestic violence as constituting a form of gender-based discrimination is therefore well-established within the UN context, and the fact that this approach is now gaining an increased level of recognition within the context of the Council of Europe is certainly to be welcomed. In addition, this recognition is not only limited to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, as will be seen below.
The Istanbul Convention
The developments Human Rights will therefore remain of substantial importance in this context.
Conclusion
In conclusion therefore, it is clear that the European Court of Human Rights has now built up a substantial body of jurisprudence as regards the issue of domestic violence.
There have been a number of very positive recent developments within this case law, such as the firm establishment of the principle that domestic violence falls within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention. The increased use of Article 14 in domestic violence cases is also to be welcomed, as this serves to highlight the principle that one of the key causes of domestic violence is the structural inequalities within society.
However, the recent case of Rumor serves to highlight the limitations of human rights law when applied to the issue of domestic violence. Even with a sophisticated doctrine of positive obligations, there are limits to how far human rights law can reach to protect individuals from violations occurring in the private sphere, such as domestic violence.
Even though the ill-treatment which the applicant had suffered was certainly 'inhuman and degrading', no breach of the Convention was found, as it was held that the state had 63 It is also worth noting that at the UN level individual complaints can be taken under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.
fulfilled its obligations in the matter. However, had the state fulfilled its duties in reality?
There are indications in the judgment that it may not have done so, and it is at least arguable that the Court itself failed to adopt a sufficiently gender-sensitive interpretation and application of the Convention in this case.
The 65 and a finding by the European Court that domestic violence may amount to torture would serve to emphasise the deplorable nature of the practice. It remains to be seen whether the Court will take such a step in the future.
